Model Review of Informal Rulemaking Recommendation 74-4 of the Administrative Conference of the United States by Richardson, Clinton
MODEL REVIEW OF INFORMAL RULEMAKING:
RECOMMENDATION 74-4 OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
The future effectiveness of informal rulemaking may hang in the
balance of a currently raging debate over the proper scope of preen-
forcement judicial review of rules informally promulgated by federal
agencies.1 "With increasing frequency, rules of general applicability
adopted by agencies informally . . . are being reviewed by [appellate
and district] courts directly," before they are adjudicatively enforced
or applied to a private party.' The subject of this preenforcement judi-
cial review, agency informal rulemaking, is a "quasi-legislative" 3 proc-
ess which, in many respects, is widely considered superior to agency
formal rulemaking and adjudication. 4  The latter generally require the
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Recommendation 74-4: Preenforcement Judicial Review of Rules of General Ap-
plicability, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1973-74 REPORT (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Recommendation 74-4];
Committee on Judicial Review of the Administrative Conference of the U.S., Sup-
porting Memorandum: Preenforcement Judicial Review of Rules of General Applicabil-
ity (1974) [hereinafter cited as Support Memo];
Recommendation E: Preenforcement Judicial Review of Rules of General Applica-
bility (Transcript of Debate on 74-4, llth Plenary Sess. of Administrative Conference
1974) [hereinafter cited as 74-4 Debate];
Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Verkuil].
1. Verkuil 185-86, See also White, Allocating Power Between Agencies and
Courts: The Legacy of Justice Brandeis, 1974 DUKE L. J. 195, 235-42, comparing Davis,
A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 713 (1969), with Jaffe, The Illusion
of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1183 (1973).
2. Recommendation 74-4, at 58. Such review takes place in three types of cases:
(1) by an appellate court under a statute vesting it with power to review "orders" of
specific agencies, e.g., Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912
(D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1074 (1972); (2) by an appellate court under a statute specifically providing
for direct review of rules of general applicability promulgated by an agency in a manner
substantially the same as outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), e.g., Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2060(c) (1972); see e.g., Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973); and (3) by district courts under their residual
power to review agency action not otherwise reviewable, see, e.g., Abbott Laboratories,
Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 167 (1967); Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1973).
For a general overview of these types of review, see Support Memo 1-2,
3. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4. See Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemak-
ing, 26 AD. L. REv. 199, 201-02 (1974), citing K. DAvis, DiscRrxoNARY JuSTIcE-A
PRELIMINARY INQuiRY (1969). See generally 1 K. DAvis § 6.01.
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full panoply of trial-type procedures including a formal evidentiary
record,5 while informal rulemaking traditionally has required only no-
tice, an opportunity to participate, and a "concise general statement"
of the agency's basis and purpose for promulgating a rule.6 Moreover,
informal rulemaking permits an agency to declare law prospectively,
to invoke broader participation in the decision-making process, and to
base a decision on a wide basis of information and agency-developed
expertise. 7 An agency is not limited, as it is in formal rulemaking and
adjudication, to considering .materials in an evidentiary record.8  The
system is fair, flexible, and efficient.9 Yet, despite its advantages, the
system is threatened because courts, frustrated with the sometimes one-
sided record presented to them by the agencies and confused over the
appropriate standard to review that record, 10 have on occasion imposed
formalizing procedures limiting the flexibility and utility of informal
rulemaking.11
In a consideration of what standard of review is appropriate, partic-
ular conceptual and practical difficulties arise in connection with the
use of the phrase "substantial evidence,'1 2 which -appears in the judicial'
review provisions of a large number of statutes authorizing agency in-
formal rulemaking.' 3 Different courts have treated the presence of the
phrase "substantial evidence' in different ways. Some have construed
this language in provisions authorizing judicial review of agency rules
to mean a higher standard of review is required than when the phrase
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1970). See notes 28-32 infra and accompanying text.
6. Id. § 553. See notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text.
7. See generally Wright, note 4 supra, at 201-02.
8. See generally id. See notes 38-54 infra and accompanying text.
9. See generally 1 K. DAvis, §§ 6.01-.12.
10. Recommendation 74-4, at 1; Verkuil 185. See notes 38-54 infra and ac-
companying text.
11. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chrysler
Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); cf. Industrial Union
Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Industrial Union Dep't, the court
noted that the Secretary of Labor had interpreted the "substantial evidence" language
in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970), as man-
dating the formalizing of informal rulemaking. 499 F.2d at 472. In compliance with
the Secretary's interpretation, he issued regulations prescribing that a "hearing" be held
and an evidentiary record be developed so that a court could review them under the sub.
stantial evidence standard. Id. at 473. See 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15 (1974).
12. Synonymous phrases are "substantial evidence on the record as a whole" and
"substantial evidence on a record."
13. E.g., Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970); Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1710 (1970); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30
U.S.C. § 816(b) (1970).
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is not present,14 while others 'have held that -the phrase adds nothing
to the otherwise generally applicable arbitrary and capricious standard
set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).15 This confusion
could be viewed as the normal pains of adjusting the meaning of the
phrase "substantial evidence" from its traditional application in the re-
view of a trial-type record produced in the formal evidentiary ,hearings
which accompany formal rulemaking and adjudication'8 to its use in
the review of the non-adjudicatory type materials produced in the con-
text of informal rulemaking.17 Persistent failure of the phrase "sub-
stantial evidence" to develop its own non-adjudicatory meaning within
the informal rulemaking context, however, suggests a problem more
basic than mere adjustment. That problem has been informal rule-
making's failure to free itself from the confines of the adjudicative
model since its formulation nearly thirty years ago.18  To date there
is no clearly defined informal rulemaking model. As a result, the
courts have not agreed upon an appropriate standard of review, and
several standards have gained recent support resulting in a lack of con-
14. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC,
487 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 964
(1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chrysler
Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying
notes 51-54 infra.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970); see, e.g., Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States
Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.). See text accompany-
ing notes 47-50 infra.
16. One common definition of "substantial evidence" illustrates how closely tied the
term has been to the adjudicative context. That definition is that "substantial evidence"
is the amount of evidence which would justify a refusal to direct a verdict when there
is a trial by a jury and the conclusion sought to be drawn from the evidence by the
jury is one of fact. Denver & Rio Grande W. Ry. v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 329,
332 (D. Colo. 1970); Asbury v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 589, 592 (W.D. Va. 1969);
First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Camp, 281 F. Supp. 786, 792 (E.D.N.C. 1968);
Acme Fast Freight, Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D. Del. 1968); Jones
v. Celebrezze, 246 F. Supp. 701, 703 (D. Kan. 1965).
17. See, e.g., Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfg. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d
Cir. 1974); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d Cir.
1973). In the Supporting Memorandum, it is stated that
[(this has led to confusion, since "evidence," substantial or otherwise, is not
a term that lawyers ordinarily use to describe unswom submissions in informal
rulemaking proceedings or undisclosed, unsworn material in agency files.
None of such material, of course, has been tested by cross-examination. More-
over, the substantial evidence standard is usually considered applicable to
agency findings of fact rather than broadly to "agency decisions." However,
findings of fact typically are not made in informal rulemaking proceedings.
Support Memo 8 (footnotes omitted).
18. For an excellent discussion of this failure, see Verkuil 230-45.
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sistency and thoroughness in the depth and quality of judicial review.19
The Administrative Conference's20 Recommendation 74-4 seeks
to remedy this situation by stating what materials should be included
in an "administrative record"2 1 for review by a court and by clarifying
the standard for reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis of, and
the rationality of, informally promulgated rules. 22  The Recommenda-
tion defines the proper standard for reviewing an "administrative
record" as the traditional arbitrary and capricious test of the APA.23
It gives this standard new meaning and bite, 'however, by applying it
to an extensive but workable "administrative record" which will be
presented to the reviewing court by the promulgating agency.24 If ac-
cepted by Congress and the judiciary, the suggestions in 74-4 will help
to create a viable working model for judicial review of the informal
rulemaking process that is both independent of its adjudicatory neigh-
bor and responsive to the need for full and fair preenforcement review
of informally promulgated rules.
This Note will explore and analyze Recommendation 74-4 and
will describe the new and independent rulemaking model its accept-
ance will usher in. It begins with a comparison of informal and formal
rulemaking and their respective traditional standards of review. It
then surveys and analyzes the present review standards applied by dif-
ferent courts to informally promulgated rules of general applicability
and discusses the ramifications of their application. This Note con-
cludes with a discussion of the provisions of Recommendation 74-4.
Special attention is given to the Recommendation's solution to the
major problem plaguing informal rulemaking review today: how to
19. See White, supra note 1, at 237-42. See notes 38-52 infra and accompanying
text.
20. The Administrative Conference of the United States was established by the Ad-
ministrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571 et seq. (1970). The Conference consists
of between seventy-five and ninety-one members including a full-time chairman ap-
pointed by the President for a five-year term, a representative from each independent
regulatory agency and executive department, attorneys, and scholars in administrative
law. Its purpose is to "provide suitable arrangements through which Federal agencies,
assisted by outside experts, may cooperatively study mutual problems, exchange informa-
tion, and develop recommendations for action by proper authorities ....... Id. § 571.
The Conference is empowered to make recommendations "to the President, Congress or
the Judicial Conference of the United States." Id. § 574.
21. Recommendation 74-4, 1, at 59; Support Memo 4-7. See text accompanying
notes 77-86 infra.
22. Recommendation 74-4, 1% 2-4, at 59-60; Support Memo 7-10. See text ac-
companying notes 111-28 infra.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970); Recommendation 74-4, at 60; 74-4 Debate 157.
24. See notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text,
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provide adequate review without destroying the effectiveness of in-
formal rulemaking by fettering it with adjudicatory chains.
STANDARDS OF REviEw
The Administrative Procedure Act
The APA,2a which provides for both informal and formal rule-
making and suggests the appropriate standards of judicial review in the
absence of a contrary statutory provision, is the appropriate place to
begin a brief examination of the rulemaking processes and the stand-
ards of review traditionally thought to be applicable to the different
types of agency action. The informal rulemaking provisions of the
APA merely require an agency to publish a notice of its proposed rule-
making, to give interested parties an opportunity to participate, and to
provide the court with a "concise general statement" of the agency's
basis and purpose for promulgating the rule.2 6 Thus, only a certain
minimum of information will be available to a court when it evaluates
an agency's informal rulemaking. Although nowhere in the APA is
it explicitly stated that informal rulemaking should be reviewed under
a certain standard, most authorities have regarded informal material
produced in informal rulemaking as amenable only to the arbitrary and
capricious review standard of -the APA.7
In contrast, the formal rulemaking provisions of the APA demand
that a more formal "hearing" procedure allowing for the development
of factual evidence be ufilized.Y "When rules are required by statute
to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,"29
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).
26. Id. § 553. While there is no requirement in section 553 that an agency provide
the reviewing court with anything more than its "concise general statement," the notice
will be part of the public record and the parties can, theoretically, reach other informa-
tion under the Freedom of Information Act, id. § 552.
27. Id. § 706(2) (A). It is interesting to note that while there is no adjudicatory
record created in informal rulemaking, the last sentence in section 706 of the APA re-
quires a reviewing court to consider the "whole record or those parts of it cited by a
party" when reviewing informal as well as formal rulemaking. This is particularly puz-
zling when it is noted that many courts which require a strict substantial evidence review
of informal rulemaking do so ostensibly for the reason that "substantial evidence" de-
mands a "record" and, therefore, infers a tougher review of more formal rulemaking pro-
cedures. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir.
1972), where the term "record" in the National Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Act of
1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1394(a) (1970), led the court to apply a substantial evidence
test under the reasoning of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1970).
28. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-57 (1970).
29. Id. § 553(c),
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representative procedural requisites, such as entitling the party to pre-
sent his case by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evi-
dence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for
a full and true disclosure of the facts, are guaranteed.80 Thus, a formal
evidentiary record is mandated, and it is to be judicially reviewed ac-
cording to the substantial evidence standard,81 -a standard traditionally
thought appropriate only when there is a formal adjudicatory-type
record to review.32
Although there is even some confusion as to the appropriate scope
of judicial review of informal rulemaking under the standards of the
APA,88 that confusion is compounded when hybrid scopes of review
are prescribed by an agency's organic statute.34  Depending upon the
particular review language utilized in the organic legislation creating
an agency 3 or the otherwise applicable review provisions of the APA,
and upon the particular court involved in review,8 6 the standard can
30. Id. §§ 556-57.
31. Id. § 706(2)(E).
32. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d Cir.
1973); Support Memo 7-8.
33. Compare United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972)
(limiting review of informal agency rulemaking to a rational basis test), with Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (stating in dictum that
the substantial evidence test should be applied to section 553 informal rulemaking).
34. Compare Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342
(2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (the rational basis test and the substantial evidence test
tend to converge in the informal rulemaking context), with Public Serv. Comm'n v.
FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J.), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 964 (1974) (not only is substantial evidence a stricter review
standard than arbitrary and capricious but the presence of substantial evidence language
in the review provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970), reflects
an intent on the part of Congress to limit informal rulemaking procedures to a formal
evidentiary record).
35. For analytical purposes, agency statutes which specifically provide for informal
rulemaking review generally can be placed into one of three categories. Some statutes,
e.g., Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et
seq. (Supp. I, 1972), defer to the review standard of the APA; others, e.g., Consumer
Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972); Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), explicitly provide for
substantial evidence review of informal rulemaking. Still others, e.g., Federal Hazardous
Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261 et seq. (1970); Poison Prevention Packaging Act of
1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972), provide for both informal and formal
rulemaking, with arbitrary and capricious review of informal rulemaking and substantial
evidence review of formal rulemaking.
36. See text accompanying notes 38-54 infra. Compare Superior Oil Co. v. FPC,
322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964) (the Ninth Circuit's
application of the arbitrary and capricious test), with International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the District of Columbia Circuit's appli-
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range from a fairly relaxed rational basis test to a severely restrictive
substantial evidence test which requires an agency to add adjudicative-
type procedures to its informal rulemaking.37 This confusion of stand-
ards is examined below.
Present Preenforcement Review Standards
Of all the review standards currently in vogue, the traditional arbi-
trary and capricious standard, as presently embodied in the APA,38 is
the oldest and least stringent.89  A court utilizing the arbitrary and
capricious standard, commonly called the "rational basis" -test, considers
informal rulemaking as a quasi-legislative process and proceeds to re-
view the challenged rule as if it were reviewing only its constitutional-
ity.4" Under this standard, a court approaches -the informal rulemaking
process with deference, asking only "whether on the factual premise
upon which the [agency] acted, the rule promulgated is unreasonable,
arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory." 41  A second more "searching
cation of the same standard). Professor Verkuil suggests that a court's perception of
the importance of a challenged rule can have a direct effect on the stringency of review.
Verkuil 209.
37. See text accompanying notes 57-63, 67-70 infra.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
39. In one of the earliest applications of this test, the Supreme Court noted that
when dealing with "mixed questions of law and fact, the court confines itself to the ulti-
mate question as to whether the [agency] acted within its power." ICC v. Union Pac.
Ry., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912). In a subsequent case, reviewing an FCC determination
that the Rochester Telephone Corporation was controlled by another company and,
therefore, was within the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
quoted an earlier opinion of Justice Cardozo, saying:
So long as there is warrant in the record for the judgment of the expert body
it must stand. . . . The judicial function is exhausted when there is found
to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1939), quoting
from, Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-87(1934).
40. Once a rational basis is found under this formulation, the courts refrain from
further review of the rulemaking process. See e.g., United States v. George S. Bush &
Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939);
Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927); Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
41. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 922 (1964). See also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S.
742 (1972), where the Court affirmed certain car service regulations promulgated infor-
mally by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to provisions of the Esch Car
Service Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (a) (1970). In its affirmance, the Court limited its re-
view to the question of whether the Commission's informal rulemaking was rationally
supported. 406 U.S. at 749. Whether this is the Supreme Court's final position on the
proper standard of review is questionable, however, since the ICCs informal rulemaking
procedures would probably have met a stricter standard if one had been imposed; more-
over, cases involving agency action other than informal rulemaking suggest that a.
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and careful" 42 standard of review also has been applied under the arbi-
trary and capricious language of -the APA.43  In fact, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus4 4 specifically has rejected the traditional rational basis -test
in favor of a tougher standard of review which will assure that agency
informal rulemaking procedures provide "a framework for principled
decision-making. '45  This reasoned decision-making standard requires
a reviewing court to examine both the agency's decision and the facts
on which that decision was premised. 46
Two additional standards for the review of informal rulemaking
have evolved from agency statutes which include "substantial evidence"
language in their informal rulemaking review sections. The first of
these tests may be classified as the "modest" substantial evidence test.47
It recognizes -that the strict review connotation that the substantial evi-
dence test carries in the adjudicatory situation should not carry over
into the informal rulemaking context where no adjudicatory record
exists. 48  Rather, courts applying this modest substantial evidence re-
view have noted that, in the review of informal rulemaking, the sub-
tougher standard may be forthcoming. See e.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649 (1972); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See generally
Verkuil 206-07.
42. This language appears in City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972), citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
44. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 651 (Bazelon, I., concurring), quoting Environmental Defense Fund v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
46. In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the court reviewed the administrator's refusal to grant a one-year suspension of standards
promulgated under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f- (b) (5) (D) (1970). The ad-
ministrator, following a public hearing, had determined that the car manufacturers had
failed to show that the technology necessary to meet the standards was unavailable. The
court refused to apply the rational basis test to the administrator's decision, which con-
stituted informal rulemaking; instead it applied a more searching standard which sug-
gested that in certain limited circumstances cross-examination on a crucial issue might
be necessary to achieve a reasoned decision. 478 F.2d at 615.
47. See, e.g., Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489
F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) ("substantial evidence" means to determine whether the
agency carried out its essentially legislative task in a reasonable manner). See also Ver-
kuil 226-30.
48. E.g., Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir.
1973), where the court held that the "record" requirement in the statutory informal rule-
making provision did not require that evidentiary facts be developed before review on
an adjudicatory-type record, as in a formal rulemaking or judicial hearing, but rather
required only that the agency proffer the comments and submissions made during the
informal rulemaking proceedings to the reviewing court.
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stantial evidence test and the rational basis test 'tend to converge." 49
Proponents of this standard contend that an agency decision which is
arbitrary and capricious must by definition be without substantial evi-
dence in its support.50 In short, this test is effectively the same as the
rational basis test. However, the tough close scrutiny connotation that
substantial evidence carries in the adjudicative context has led other
courts to conclude that the substantial evidence test as applied to in-
formal rulemaking is a stricter standard of review than the arbitrary
and capricious test.51  This tough-minded substantial evidence test re-
quires a reviewing court to take a closer look at an agency's informal
determination than does either the arbitrary and capricious test or -the
modest substantial evidence test, -and it requires something more from
an agency than traditional informal rulemaking.52  At the same time,
this test, as do the others, acknowledges that an agency will define its
own record for review.53 Under this standard, the agency promulgating
a rule informally must show, based on a record which is more extensive
than that required under arbitrary and capricious review, that sub-
stantial evidence supports its rule and not merely that its decision was
not arbitrary and capricious.54
Ramifications of the Review Standards
A court which reviews an agency rule promulgated informally
should insure that the agency's rule resulted from fair and reasoned
decision-making55 and that -the agency employed a procedurally sound,
open, and discriminating informal promulgation process. 56 In seeking
49. Associated Indus., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350 (2d
Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.); accord, Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't
of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 508 (D. Del. 1973).
50. See L. JAFFE 602-04 (1965); Scala & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 899, 933-36 (1973).
51. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court stated
that "the Natural Gas Act term 'substantial evidence' smacks of a judicial proceeding."
Id. at 1262.
52. See id. What that something extra required is is less than clear from the opin-
ion, though it does require some record other than the agency's concise general state-
ment. Cf. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
53. Verkuil 224-25.
54. See note 64 infra. In Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
95 S. Ct. 438 (1974), Justice Douglas, while discussing the disposition in the lower
court, stated that a decision may be supported by substantial evidence and still reflect
arbitrary and capricious action. Id. at 441.
55. Verkuil 230.
56. This does not mean adding formalizing procedures to informal rulemaking.
Rather, it means that notice and comment rulemaking operates efficiently so as to max-
imize public input and rational agency decisionmaking. Id.
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to guarantee those goals, the courts should be wary of encumbering
the informal rulemaking process with more formal, and hence less
flexible, procedures. None of the standards of review currently being
applied fully achieves these goals.
The rational basis test allows an agency to run an efficient rule-
making process.G7  It places no fetters of consequence upon the agency
and only requires it to make a decision that has some rational basis
of support. 58 A court reviewing an informally promulgated rule under
this standard makes no examination into the factual premises under-
lying the agency's rule; rather, it assumes the proffered facts are true
and determines on that assumption whether there is a rational basis
for -the rule.59  If there is, the rule is sustained.60  No further attempt
is made to review the facts which underlie the agency's rule, 61 and
agency good faith is assumed.6 2 Moreover, reliance upon agency
expertise can run to extremes. 63  Thus, the rational basis test allows
only a cursory judicial check over agency abuse or grossly inappropriate
decisions.
The reasoned decision test permits a more satisfactory judicial
examination of both the rule promulgated by the agency and the facts
underlying the rule. 4  It is a stricter standard than the rational basis
57. In this context, "efficient" means rulemaking which runs smoothly and reaches
rational decisions with a minimum of effort At the same time, however, the rational
basis test provides a lazy agency with the opportunity to escape effective review by the
manner in which it frames its "concise general statement."
58. Information which is presented to the agency but is not contained in the
agency's concise general statement could be overwhelmingly against the agency's deter-
mination, while on the evidence before it-the agency's concise general statement-the
reviewing court could find that the agency's determination is rationally supported.
59. "If the factual premise were itself open to review, then it would be necessary
for all general rule-making to include a trial-like hearing . . . . mhis is not required."
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922
(1964).
60. We do not weigh evidence introduced before the Commission; we do not
inquire into the wisdom of the regulations that the Commission promulgates,
and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which the Commission
reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported.
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 (1972).
See generally Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 922 (1964).
61. See Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 922 (1964).
62. This is implicit in a standard of review which scrutinizes the decision but not
the rationality of the facts supporting the decision.
63. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
64. The record compiled for review must be more complete for substantial evidence
review than for arbitrary and capricious review. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974). See text
accompanying note 46 supra.
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test, requiring not only a review of the rationale underlying the rule
but also a review of the factual determinations which support the rule
and were made during the rulemaking process.6 5 Still, it is the agency
which selects and proffers the materials which the court reviews. Thus,
without an affirmative duty to present a full and balanced picture of
the information it considered, an agency can avoid effective review of
both its rationale and the underlying factual basis by a careful selection
and presentation of only supportive facts. 60
The tough-minded substantial evidence test provides for a rela-
tively more searching and thorough review. 67  At the same time, how-
ever, this standard requires something new from the agency in the form
of new procedures and new "reviewable record" materials.68  While
requiring an agency to provide additional material to a reviewing court
is not necessarily a bad thing for the informal rulemaking process, 69
the requirement that traditional informal rulemaking techniques be
burdened with additional formalized procedures in order to meet the
substantial evidence test could inhibit the efficiency and effectiveness
of the informal rulemaking process. 70  In effect, this system of review
creates a hybrid rulemaking, neither formal nor informal, a weak half
sister to both.
While all the current review standards provide for at least some
judicial scrutiny of agency action, all fail as truly effective standards
65. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion recognizes that this reaction to the rational basis test
may involve a cure which is worse than the ailment, namely "substantive evaluation of
the Administrator's assumptions and methodology." Id. at 651. He prefers a "process"
review in which the reviewing court reviews the adequacy of the informal rulemaking
process and avoids substantive review of the wisdom of the agency's factual and deci-
sional determinations. Id. at 650-52.
66. There is no requirement that an agency present all the evidence for and against
its rule. As such, its "concise general statement" in support of the rule can be expected
to be just that, a concise general support statement.
67. The rule must be supported by substantial evidence and not merely by a rational
basis.
68. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 964 (1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483
F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659
(6th Cir. 1972).
69. In fact, Recommendation 74-4 suggests that additional material in the form of
an "administrative record" be required to be presented to a reviewing court. Recommen-
dation 74-4, 1, at 59. See notes 77-86 infra and accompanying text.
70. "There is a danger that this engrafting of elements of the adjudicative model
onto the rulemaking model will become a means of turning one [informal rulemaking]
into the other [formal rulemaking]." Verkuil 238; cf. K. DAVIs § 6.15, at 284 (Supp.
1970) (informal rulemaking is superior to formal rulemaking as a prospective decision-
making device because it has no adjudicative on-the-record requirements).
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because they allow the agency to select and define those materials it
tenders to a court for review. Without a standard record which pre-
sents to a reviewing court all sides of the relevant issues as they were
presented to and considered by the agency, no court can insure an ade-
quate and fair review, no matter 'how demanding the standard of re-
view. This inadequacy 'arises from one of the inherent strengths of
informal rulemaking-an agency's consideration is not confined -to mat-
ters presented with full adjudicatory safeguards or upon a trial-type
record. In fact, an agency in the process of informal rulemaking may
consider materials, including its own expertise and unsworn testimony,
none of which currently needs to be presented to a court for review.7'
This flexibility in the informal rulemaking process makes judicial re-
view difficult. Furthermore, there is presently no standard, represent-
ative administrative record which an agency must present to a court
for review.
RECOMMENDATION 74-4
In response -to -the confusing array of informal rulemaking review
standards presently being utilized and to the ineffectiveness of these
standards for purposes of judicial review, the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States has recommended a model for preenforce-
ment judicial review of rules of general applicability promulgated pur-
suant to informal rulemaking.72  This model requires an agency en-
gaged in informal rulemaking to create an "administrative record" of
certain materials it has considered, 73 and it suggests that, notwith-
standing -the wording of an agency's organic statute directing substantial
evidence or similar judicial review, the appropriate review standard is
the traditional arbitrary and capricious test74 found in the review pro-
visions of the APA.75
The Conference recognizes that since the agencies are not con-
fined to an evidentiary record in making their decisions of what rules
to promulgate, it is often unclear what information a court on preen-
71. See Verkuil 224; cf. 1 K. DAvis § 7.06, at 430.
72. Recommendation 74-4, at 58. The Recommendation is addressed to Congress,
the Judicial Conference, and the many administrative agencies in the hope that its ac-
ceptance by these bodies will lead to a fair and responsible level of review by the review-
ing courts without the necessity of changing the informal rulemaking process into a cum-
bersome or unattractive hybrid. Id.
73. Recommendation 74-4, 1, at 59; Support Memo 4; 74-4 Debate 152 (Verkuil).
74. Recommendation 74-4, 11 2-4, at 59-60; Support Memo 7-10; 74-4 Debate
155-60 (Verkuil).
75, 5 U.S.C, § 706(2) (A) (1970).
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forcement review should demand in evaluating an agency's decision.'t8
It seeks to remedy this situation by suggesting the creation of an "ad-
ministrative record' 77 which, while not an "evidentiary record,"
78
would be a recording of the information that the agency considered
in its decision-making. The Recommendation delineates six types of
material that should be included in this "administrative record":79
(1) the notice of the proposed rulemaking and any documents
referred to therein; 0
(2) the comments and other documents submitted by interested
persons;8
1
(3) transcripts of oral presentations made during the course of
the rulemaking; 2
(4) "factual information" not included elsewhere that was "con-
sidered by the authority responsible" for -the promulgation
of the rule or that is proffered by the agency as pertinent
to the nle";8
4
76. Support Memo 5; see Verkuil 224-25.
77. This term is used by Professor Verkuil. 74-4 Debate 154.
78. Support Memo 5.
79. The numbered provisions in the text correspond directly to the like numbered
subsections of paragraph one of the Recommendation. Recommendation 74-4, at 59.
80. Id. Notice of proposed rulemaking is already required by courts on review. 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1970). The supplying of documents referred to in the notice serves to
give a more complete record of the notice given and, when those documents are part
of a public record, to create a more convenient review record for the court. Support
Memo 5. If notice is inadequate, then the enacted rule may be outside the proper scope
of the proposed rulemaking since one of the functions of review is to determine if the
agency considered all relevant comments before making its determination. Verkuil 235.
Inadequate notice is an independent ground for remand. See Wagner Elec. Corp. v.
Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
81. Recommendation 74-4, at 59. The Conference considers these to be a review
"staple" and analogizes these documents to an evidentiary record in an adjudicatory set-
ting. Support Memo 5.
82. Recommendation 74-4, at 59. This is not to suggest that oral presentations
must or should be made, but only that if they are made then they should be recorded
for the aid of a reviewing court. Support Memo 5.
83. The language "considered by the authority responsible" is meant to limit the vol-
ume of information an agency must file under this subsection. The Committee's purpose
under this provision is not to require unreasonable quantities and species of information
from agencies which requirement could discourage the use of informal rulemaking. See
Support Memo 15 n.12. See text accompanying notes 99-103 infra.
84. Recommendation 74-4, at 59. This is the novel part of paragraph one. It re-
moves an agency's power to define its own record and mandates that the agency provide
the reviewing court with the information it relied upon. Support Memo 6. This man-
date is directed to the problem created by an agency's present ability to define its own
review "record." For a discussion of this provision, see notes 91-110 infra and accom-
panying text,
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(5) reports of advisory committees;8 5 and,
(6) the agency's concise general statement or final order and any
documents referred to therein. 6
The remainder of the Recommendation advocates the application
of a type 7 of the rationally supported review standard to the "adminis-
trative record." 8 Moreover, any substantial evidence language in the
agency's authorizing statute is not to be interpreted as implying that any
particular procedures must be followed by an agency during informal
rulemaking 89 in addition to those specified for traditional informal rule-
making in the APA.9°
Ramifications of Recommendation 74-4
The requirement that an agency include in the materials pre-
sented to the court for review all "factual information [which was] con-
sidered by the authority responsible for promulgation of the rule" is
perhaps the most important and innovative idea in the Recommenda-
tion.01 In effect, it requires the promulgating agency to compile and
present to a reviewing court a representative record of the information
it relied upon during the rulemaking, thus removing the -agency's tra-
ditional power to define its own reviewable record. 2 By requiring an
85. Recommendation 74-4, at 59. Some statutes provide for formally designated ad-
visory committees. E.g., Color Additive Amendments of 1960, 21 U.S.C. § 346a
(1970); Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1970). This
section requires the inclusion of their reports.
86. Recommendation 74-4, at 59. This coincides closely with the requirement of
section 553 (c) of the APA that an agency incorporate in its rule a concise general state-
ment of its basis and purpose.
87. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
88. Recommendation 74-4, at 59-60. The Conference accepts the proposition ad-
vanced by supporters of the modest substantial evidence test, i.e., that the arbitrary and
capricious and substantial evidence tests are essentially the same. Id. IT 3, at 60. The
Recommendation adopts the arbitrary and capricious language in favor of the substantial
evidence language to avoid the confusion surrounding the substantial evidence test as ap-
plied to informal rulemaking as to whether substantial evidence language requires "evi-
dence" in the traditional adjudicatory sense and, therefore, requires some kind of adjudi-
catory procedures. Id. The Recommendation answers this question in the negative. Id.
89. Id. 2, at 59-60.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
91. Recommendation 74-4, 1, pt. 4, at 59; Support Memo 5-6.
92. "It seems only proper that all significant and relevant factual information should
be made available to the court on review." Support Memo 6. "mhe Commission
should be mandated to provide what it relied upon . . . ." 74-4 Debate 153 (Verkuil).
"fl]t is monstrous ... to suppose that an agency should not tell the parties to the liti-
gation or disclose to them everything they relied upon or considered to make the rule."
Id. at 181 (Kramer). "lit is incumbent upon us in (4) to make sure that the agency
puts into the record on appeal the kind of material that should be available to the courts
to consider, whether or not it hurts, whether or not it is material that has been rejected
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"administrative record" which presents materials both in favor of and
in opposition to the agency's determination,93 the Conference has sug-
gested the creation of a record which may, unlike its predecessors,94
actually subject informal rulemaking to a fair and adequate judicial re-
view without changing informal rulemaking into a quasi-formal and less
effective rulemaking process.",
Under current informal rulemaking review standards there is no
assurance that both sides contesting a rule will be fairly represented. 0
Some courts have attacked the inherent unfairness of an agency-pre-
pared administrative support document serving as a review record by
implying that a "substantial evidence" or "whole record" requirement
in an agency's organic legislation requires procedures in addition to
those of traditional informal rulemaking.97  Such procedures, however,
are patchwork and often decrease the effectiveness of 'the informal
rulemaking process by requiring the -addition of adjudicatory-type pro-
cedures to informal rulemaking.98 The Conferences "administrative
by the agency, not just to define the record as carefully as it can in its own favor." Id.
at 187 (Verkuil).
93. It was proposed in debate, 74-4 Debate 177 (Auerbach), and rejected, id. at 187,
that the Conference delete the section mandating agencies to create a two-sided record
and to allow the parties to the review litigation to put before the court what they con-
sider relevant. During the course of debate, Mr. Zener suggested the use of the Free.
dom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as an alternative to a two-sided record.
74-4 Debate 184-85. It was thought by Conference members that a full and balanced
record requirement was necessary out of principle and political necessity in light of con-
gressional and judicial movements towards formalizing informal rulemaking. Id. at 181,
187 (Kramer and Verkuil). Though not expressly voiced, it seems apparent that the
reason for rejecting a parties-create-the-record approach was that the record require-
ments were seen as an integral ingredient in the scope of the review requirement. With-
out the more complete record requirements, the arbitrary and capricious standard of re-
view suggested in the Recommendation would be a less effective standard. The record
and the review standards are inextricably bound. To allow a less than full administra-
tive record would be to decrease the effectiveness of the rational basis standard of pre-
enforcement judicial review.
94. See text accompanying notes 55-70 supra.
95. Such a quasi-formal process is exactly what one jurist thinks is required by "sub-
stantial evidence" language. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1053 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, I.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 964
(1974). See authorities cited in note 68 supra.
96. See note 58 supra.
97. Such procedures include the limited cross-examination suggested in International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Thomp-
son v. Washington, 497 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of
Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972). But cf. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n
v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
98. The best example is the judiciary's recommendation of cross-examination in lim-




record" requirement attacks the problem of inadequate review material
directly, without adding adjudicative procedures -to the non-adjudicative
informal rulemaking process, and mandates the creation of a record
capable of supporting an adequate review.
How extensive a record must an agency compile? Must every-
thing that anyone in the agency looks at or listens to be included in
the record? These and other questions were raised99 before the cur-
rent "considered by the authority responsible" language was added to
the Recommendation. 100 The purpose for adding this language was
twofold: first, to limit to a manageable size the material which an
agency must present to a reviewing court; and second, to insure that
material which was considered significant "by those whose thinking is
of significance in the process" is included in the record.10 1 Appar-
ently, something considered by someone such as an agency clerk or
rejected by someone in the lower echelons of the agency need not
be included. 0 2 Where to draw the line, however, between -those
whose thinking is significant in the process and those whose thinking
is not is a question left unanswered by the Conference. The language
"considered by the authority" should probably be limited to the person
or persons who actually render a decision in the form of a rule, but
it could be read to include a larger class of persons depending on how
broadly the word "authority" is defined. The failure of the Conference
to delineate more clearly the breadth of material required -for review
leaves a reviewing court which adopts the Recommendation with a dif-
ficult problem of interpretation. However, it also leaves that court with
a tool for increasing or decreasing -the amount of material subject to
review without altering the arbitrary and capricious standard. By in-
terpreting the word "authority" broadly, a court can fashion its review
standard into a more searching review than would be possible on a
narrower "administrative record" created by a narrower interpretation
of the word "authority." In short, the word "authority" adds an ele-
ment of flexibility -to the "administrative record" so that it can be fitted
to the particular procedures followed by a particular agency. It gives
an anxious court a tool for increasing the intensity of factual review
without the necessity of adopting a troublesome substantial evidence
test. 1
0 3
99. 74-4 Debate 178-80 (Zener).
100. Id. at 188.
101. Id. at 191 (Gellhom).
102. Id.
103. See notes 111-28 infra and accompanying text.
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The Conference specifically states that the Recommendation takes
no position with respect to an agency's use of its expertise in reaching
a decision through informal rulemaking. 04  Agency expertise has long
been recognized as a valid, but not exclusive, tool of agency decision-
making in the informal rulemaking context. 10 5  Indeed, one of the
strengths of agency rulemaking is the ability of an agency to acquire
expertise and then to apply that expertise in future agency rulemak-
ing. Where does Recommendation 74-4 stand on the expertise prob-
lem? Although the Recommendation makes no specific mention of a
solution to the problem, it does deal indirectly with some expertise
problems through its "administrative record" requirements.
Improper use of agency expertise can be one method of avoiding
effective judicial review of informal rulemaking. By relying heavily
on its expertise, an agency has the ability to avoid effective review by
removing some factual decision-making considerations from the re-
viewing court's vision. 1' 6 To counteract such an evasion, a reviewing
court could demand to examine the reasons behind the applied exper-
tise under the "considered by" language of Recommendation 74 -4 .101
Again a question of judicial interpretation is raised. Material "con-
sidered by" could be read expansively to include explanations of
agency expertise relied upon in the agency's determinations. Such an
interpretation seems fair in view of the large role agency expertise can
play in informal rulemaking and of the acknowledged need to provide
for adequate review of rules promulgated thereby. This interpretation
also would answer the fears of one Conference member that the "con-
sidered by the -authority" language could require the recording of in-
formation and expertise which came to the authority's attention at any
time and thus create an impractically large record. 08 Assuming such
a reasonable interpretation, this language would require that the pres-
entation of factual information gathered during the informal rulemak-
ing process as well as an explanation of expertise the agency relied
upon during the rulemaking under review be included in the "ad-
ministrative record."'0 9  The rationale underlying the expertise previ-
ously acquired and presently utilized by the agency should provide a
104. Support Memo 3.
105. 1 K. DAVIs § 7.06, at 429.
106. See, e.g., Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. Rv. 436, 471-75 (1954).
107. Recommendation 74-4, 1, pt. 4, at 59.
108. 74-4 Debate 184 (Collier).
109. This would be one kind of timing device suggested by Mr. Collier. Id.
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sufficient basis for review.110
The Conference further suggests that the rational basis standard
be utilized in all preenforcement judicial review.1 This is a conscious
rejection of -the decisions of certain courts 1 2 that the "substantial evi-
dence" language appearing in some agency authorizing statutes13 con-
notes a subjectively tougher standard than arbitrary and capricious re-
view" 4-- which tougher standard, in some instances, had been inter-
preted to mandate the use by an agency of adjudicative4ype pro-
cedures." r  The Conference's suggestion recognizes the arbitrary and
capricious standard of -the APA"16 as the most appropriate standard of
preenforcement review for rules promulgated informally by adminis-
trative agencies." 7 It also recognizes that while "substantial evidence"
connotes a tougher review standard than "arbitrary and capricious!' in
the adjudicatory context, such a connotation should not carry over into
the informal rulemaking context." 8  Under ,the Conference's rea-
110. This is a practical solution which will insure reasoned decision-making. Courts
can require additional information if needed. Recommendation 74-4, I 1, at 59.
111. Id. 1% 24, at 59-60.
112. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483
F.2d 1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
113. See statutes cited in note 13 supra.
114. Recommendation 74-4, If 2, at 59-60. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying
text.
115. The term "substantial evidence on the record as a whole," or comparable
language, in statutes authorizing judicial review should not, in and of itself, be
taken by agencies or courts as implying that any particular procedures must
be followed by the agency whose actions are subject to the statute and, in par-
ticular, should not be taken as a legislative prescription that in rulemaking
agencies must follow procedures in addition to those specified in 5 U.S.C. §
553. Id. 2, at 59-60.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
117. The appropriate standard for determining whether a rule of general appli-
cability adopted after informal rulemaking rests on an adequate foundation is
stated in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A), which provides that a reviewing court must
set aside action found to be "arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion."
Where such a rule is attacked on the ground that an asserted factual basis does
not support it or that a necessary factual foundation is lacking, this standard
requires a reviewing court to decide, in light of the information before it (in-
cluding the administrative materials described in paragraph 1), whether the
agency's conclusions concerning the significance of factual information can be
said to be rationally supported. Recommendation 74-4, 3, at 60.
See also 74-4 Debate 157 (Verkuil).
118. Statutes providing for judicial review of rules adopted after informal rule-
making should refer only to the standards for review of such rules set forth
in 5 U.S.C. § 706, including the "arbitrary, capricious, [or] abuse of discre-
tion" standard of Section 706 (2) (A) (but not including the "substantial evi-
dence" standard of Section 706 (2) (E), which by its terms is inapplicable to
such rules). Properly applied, those standards are adequate to ensure appropri-
ate judicial scrutiny of rules adopted informally. Judicial review statutes that
speak in terms of review according to the standard of "substantial evidence"
should be construed as establishing a standard of review over informal rule-
making comparable to that set forth in Section 706 (2) (A), unless a contrary
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soning, the substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards
are effectively the same when applied to preenforcement informal rule-
making review.119 Moreover, the choice of the arbitrary and capri-
cious test is an acceptance of rational basis review 20 and a rejection of
the concept that "substantial evidence" language in an organic statute
requires procedures in addition to those of traditional informal rule-
making.121 In fact, when such language appears, the Recommendation
suggests that its adjudicatory connotations be disregarded and that the
arbitrary and capricious standard be applied.' 22 Since the two stand-
ards are considered to be essentially .the same, the "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" language which is unencumbered with adjudicatory connota-
tions is preferable. 123
But the rational basis test per se is not the Recommendation's
standard. 24  The Recommendation's test requires a full "administra-
tive record," and as such it .allows a quantitatively more thorough re-
view than does the traditional rational basis test, which accepts the facts
an agency chooses to submit. The conference's standard is more in line
with the reasoned decision -review presently used by some courts under
the arbitrary and capricious rubric.12 5  The "reasoned decision" lan-
guage is mentioned in -the debate126 and can be used to summarize the
Conference's view of the proper purpose of informal rulemaking judi-
cial review. Since the review contemplated by the Recommendation
includes reviewing the factual foundations of the promulgated rule as
well as the rationality of the rule, it resembles the reasoned decision-
making review, which also looks at both the facts and the court's ration-
intent clearly appears. Recommendation 74-4, 4, at 60.
See also 74-4 Debate 158 (Verkuil).
119. See Support Memo 9. See quotation in note 118 supra.
120. See quotation in note 117 supra. The rational basis test is discussed in notes
3841 supra and accompanying text.
121. See quotation in note 115 supra. The tough-minded substantial evidence test
is discussed in text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
122. Recommendation 74-4, at 59-60; Support Memo 10. This is not true if the or-
ganic statute in which the substantial evidence language appears "clearly" expresses a
contrary intent. Recommendation 74-4, 4, at 60. Although the Conference never
specifies what words would "clearly" express a contrary intent, it is evident that substan-
tial evidence or comparable evidence is not, in and of itself, enough to express such a
clear intent. See id. 2, at 59-60.
123. Recommendation 744, 3, at 60. For a full quotation of paragraph 3, see
note 117 supra.
124. Such a per se rational basis test is utilized in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972). For a discussion of the per se test, see notes 38-
41 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
126. 74-4 Debate 157 (Verkuil).
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ale.' 27  However, it differs from that review in that it requires an
agency to compile an "administrative record" to present to the court
for both factual and decisional review, and it does not depend on an
agency-selected support document to present the reviewable materi-
als.-1 28
In a separate statement accompanying the Conference's recom-
mendation, Professor Davis raises a second substantial evidence ques-
tion. Professor Davis -argues that while the arbitrary and capricious
standard is the proper test for reviewing the rationality of an informally
promulgated rule, the tougher substantial evidence -test should be ap-
plied when the review focuses upon a factual finding in support of the
rule. " ' He cites in support Judge McGowan's recent opinion in
Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson13 0 to the effect that "when
the facts .. . are susceptable [sic] of being found in the usual sense,
that must be done, and the reviewing court will weigh them by the
substantial evidence standard."' 31  Professor Davis' analysis contrasts
the fact-finding element of rulemaking with its pure legislative judg-
ment aspect.' 3 2  Further, he equates informal rulemaking fact finding
with .adjudicatory fact finding, the latter of which has traditionally been
susceptible to substantial evidence review.133  The Conference re-
jected this suggestion,' 3 4 noting that "fact finding," as it is commonly
understood, is a peculiarly adjudicative process designed to determine
the truth or falsehood of particular facts whose determination enables
127. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 91-98 supra.
129. K. Davis, Recommendation E: Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking 3 (un-
dated statement, Administrative Conference); 74-4 Debate 195-98.
130. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
131. Id. at 474; see Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfg. Ass'n v. Brennan, 489 F.2d 120
(5th Cir. 1974); cf. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
132. K. Davis, supra note 129, at 6.
133. "The main difference in the two standards is that 'arbitrary and capricious' ap-
plies in the main to discretion, policy, and legislative judgment, whereas 'substantial evi-
dence' applies in the main to findings of fact." Id. at 3; 74-4 Debate 194-97 (Davis).
But see Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There the
court stated that
some of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on
the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to them insufficient
data is presently available to make a fully informed factual determination. De-
cision making must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policyjudgments and less upon purely factual analysis. Thus, in addition to currently
unresolved factual issues, the formulation of standards involves choices that by
their nature require basic policy determinations rather than resolution of
factual controversies. Judicial review of inherently legislative decisions of this
sort is obviously an undertaking of different dimensions. Id. at 474-75 (foot-
notes omitted).
134, See, e.g., 744 Debate 202, 212 (Gellhorn).
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a court to fit those facts into a predetermined law.135  This process
involves testimony and cross-examination of witnesses to insure the
truthfulness of -the final fact determination, since once hardened, the
facts will be fit into an existing law to determine the result of the case.
Informal rulemaking involves a dissimilar process. 136 Its central pur-
pose is not -to plug a determined fact into a predetermined law but
rather to develop a rational and effective rule after a consideration of
a wide basis of material.' 37 This process can be analogized to legislation
in which a legislator (rulemaker) properly exercises a judgment and
formulates a rule without having an evidentiary-type foundation of the
sort which would readily yield to substantial evidence review.'3 8 In
short, informal rulemaking does not deal with specific findings of fact
in an adjudicatory sense. It deals with them in a legislative sense, and
therefore, review of factual issues in informal rulemaking may not ra-
tionally be subjected to the conventionally tougher substantial evidence
review.
Policy reasons also argue 'against the application of the substantial
evidence standard of review -to the factual determinations underlying
a rule, while applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to deter-
mine the rationality of a rule. Each rulemaking process involves the
consideration of a countless number of separate factual issues; to
require the application of adjudicatory procedures to each such issue
would impose an impractically heavy burden which would either render
informal rulemaking an inefficient and useless decision-making device
or would so formalize informal rulemaking as to make it indistinguish-
able from formal rulemaking.'3 9 Either result could lead to the end
of informal rulemaking and its attendant advantages. Additionally,
arbitrary and capricious review on an "administrative record" seems
135. If an agency engages in such activity, then the substantial evidence test may be
most appropriate. Id. at 206-07 (Auerbach).
136. Id. at 212-13 (Gellhorn).
137. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In rule-making. . . an agency's task is not to test raw evidence against
a single, pre-established standard; rather the agency is to fashion a host of new
legal standards-regulations-having prospective effect. A rule-making agency
makes not one but dozens of "ultimate" decisions-not only because a set of
regulations has many provisions, but also because adoption of any one provi-
sion constitutes a simultaneous rejection of many possible alternatives. Few
if any of these "ultimate" decisions will depend on factual conclusions of the
sort conventional in adjudication. Looking to the future, and commanded by
Congress to make policy, a rule-making agency necessarily deals less with "evi-
dentiary" disputes than with normative conflicts, projections from imperfect
data, experiments and simulations, educated predictions, differing assessments
of possible risks, and the like. Id. at 734-35.
138. 74-4 Debate 212-13 (Gellhorn).
139. Id. at 209, 213 (Verkuil, Zener).
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sufficient since rulemakers cannot be expected to be able to harden
all the reasons and facts they rely upon in their rulemaking. Just as
with legislators, a rulemaker will often have to make decisions on rea-
sonable inferences and rational conclusions based on less than adjudica-
torially verified information.
CONCLUSION
Recommendation 74-4 offers the best solution to date to the ques-
tion of what should be the proper standard of preenforcement judicial
review of informally promulgated rules of general applicability. Its
solution is not simply a selection of arbitrary and capricious review over
substantial evidence review. Rather, Recommendation 74-4 suggests
a standard of review which is tougher than the traditional rational basis
-test per se while retaining the rational basis language. This retention
of language is unfortunate since it obscures the clarity of -the Confer-
ence's solution to the real problem underlying the standard of review
debate: how to increase 'the effectiveness of traditional arbitrary and
capricious review without destroying the effectiveness of informal rule-
making as a legislative-type decision-making device. The Confer-
ence's solution is to create a flexible "administrative record" in order
to provide the reviewing court with something it has heretofore lacked,
namely, an accurate and representative recording of the material which
the agency considered in the promulgation of its rule. This should ef-
fectively increase the quality of review by providing the reviewing court
with the raw material necessary to accomplish a thoroughgoing review.
With this "administrative record" as a basis, the Recommendation's
arbitrary and capricious test takes on new bite and becomes a review
standard more capable than its traditional predecessor of providing ef-
fective review of informal rulemaking.
The "administrative record" suggestion provides 'a critical -advan-
tage over the tough-minded substantial evidence test as well. It does
not require that burdensome adjudicative procedures be forced upon
the informal rulemaking process. Such procedures effectively change
the informal rulemaking process into a quasi-adjudicative process, de-
creasing its effectiveness as a legislative-type decision-making process
by limiting its ability to consider wide varieties and sources of informa-
tion. The Recommendation's "administrative record" -approach, by
contrast, is engineered to reflect the strengths of the informal rule-
making process (in much the same way an evidentiary record reflects
the strengths of the adjudicative process) and to preserve the vitality
of informal rulemaking with its varied channels of input.
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